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THIS WEEK:—

“How Shall Our New Possessions be Governed?”

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How Shall Our New Possessions be Governed?

President Gunton's second lecture in the course of 1898-99 is, in answer to the question: How Shall Our New Possessions be Governed? as follows:

I remember in 1866 when Mr. Gladstone introduced in the House of Commons what is known as the Second Reform Bill, proposing to extend the franchise in England to the laboring classes, the Right Honorable Robert Lowe, afterwards Viscount Sherbrooke, made a speech of something over two hours' duration, vigorously opposing the Reform Bill on the ground that it was taking the political power out of the hands of the responsible classes of the community and putting it into the hands of the ignorant and incompetent. The bill passed, however, and the

franchise was extended to the working men, at least in the cities and boroughs of England. When this became a fact, Mr. Lowe made another speech which was quite as significant as the former one. The substance of this speech was: You have opened the flood-gates of democracy; you have put the political torch into the hands of the ignorant masses; now the imperative duty, as a matter of self-preservation, is to educate them, or they may soon apply the torch that will destroy your house.

This is very much the position of the United States to-day in reference to the new territory which has just fallen into our hands. There is a sense in which this has been in part involuntary, as a consequence of the war; but through whatever cause, we now have Hawaii and Porto Rico, and are essentially responsible for Cuba, and may become responsible for the Philippines. The question, therefore, of moment-

ous import, not alone to the people of these islands but to ourselves and to civilization in general, is, how shall the problem of government for these peoples be solved?

We stand before the world as representing the highest type of democratic institutions, with the elective principle running completely through our whole fabric of government. It is a part of the Monroe Doctrine, which is the declaration of national policy for this country, that we shall use our influence to prevent the introduction of monarchical institutions into any part of this hemisphere. That is to say, that no people in this hemisphere shall be compelled to accept a monarchical form of government; that we will not merely aid them in resisting this but we will affirmatively aid, in every way possible, all the influences which make for rapid growth towards the most complete free democratic institutions.

Of course, as a doctrine of political philosophy, this assumes that the growth of political institutions in the various countries of America towards democracy shall be natural, shall be the process of evolution; and that all the influences which stimulate that tendency it shall be our

policy to encourage and aid in every way possible.

That is quite a different thing, however, from a sudden and complete change in the whole type and structure of governments within a few months. This is not evolution, but revolution. In the evolution of political institutions, safety consists in leaving very much to formation by natural forces. The interests of the people under normal progressive conditions shape political institutions by the very industrial and social necessity, but when revolution arrives, then the greatest wisdom is required—perhaps wisdom that has never yet been quite adequate to the occasion. A revolution always involves, as an after consequence, an arbitrary political constitution, because the changes are so sudden, and class interests, which may have united for the purpose of the revolution, are found to be very diverse when peaceful life is resumed. It is necessary, therefore, as a result of revolution, always to have a more or less arbitrary political instrument or constitution, which shall define the rights, possibilities and powers, not merely of the people, but of the government itself.

For this reason, a government

established by revolution always labors under great disadvantages. Even our own constitution, which is undoubtedly the best the world has yet evolved, has many such disadvantages. The forms of federal election,—for instance the ironclad provision that each state shall be equally represented in the Senate, thus making Nevada with its forty-five thousand population equal in the national Senate to New York,—a provision which involves a very wise principle, *viz.*: representation of each state as a political unity distinct from the direct citizenship representation in the House of Representatives; a provision which was wholly unobjectionable when the constitution was adopted, but with the growth of our country has now produced the extreme anomaly just referred to. This furnishes a tempting bait for political parties to convert territories, regardless of their industrial or political fitness, into states, in order that they may add two members of their party to the United States Senate. A close contest between political parties is constantly leading to this method of gaining advantage. It is in this way that most of the mountain states, several of which have not a population sufficient to entitle them to a single representa-

tive in Congress, were made into states and given two Senators and one Congressman, solely through the necessities of one or the other of the political parties.

This has already come very near creating a national crisis. The whole silver question, with its implied legislative threat to the industrial and financial stability of the nation, hinged on this process. But for the abnormal power of these skeleton states in the Senate that crisis would not have occurred. I mention this, which is one of the features of our Constitution that will have some day to be reformed, as one of the disadvantages which necessarily accompany arbitrary or written constitutions which are formulated as a consequence of sudden social and political revolution.

Our new possessions are of this character. With the exception of Hawaii, they have been under the control of the most backward form of monarchy. They are wholly unacquainted with the influence and working of representative institutions. Industrially they are practically in the Middle Ages, where the priest and the baron exercised the chief authority. How shall they be governed by the United States, then, is the

question. As I said, we are the representatives of the most complete type of democratic government. Shall we have two forms of government, or shall we extend the democracy which prevails in the United States to these new possessions?

For a long time it was a stigma on the name and pretensions of this republic,—nay, a scandal, that the nation which stood for and proclaimed to the world the very acme of human freedom had a great section of its country governed under the system of chattel slavery, of the most complete kind. Not until 1865 was there any real consistency in the freedom pretensions of the United States. If we institute monarchy or political despotism, or military rule, over the peoples of these new possessions, then we are countenancing the monarchical principle; then we are adopting the form of government and political methods which the Monroe Doctrine declares it to be a part of our mission and destiny to prevent from ever entering this hemisphere.

On the other hand, can we establish complete democracy in these new territories? Is that proposition feasible? Are the peoples of Hawaii, Porto Rico,

the Philippine Islands and Cuba capable of self-government under complete democratic freedom such as prevails in the United States? Here we come to the practical question which always has to be met when a real problem is to be solved. Abstract doctrine is one thing; practical success is another. The truth of the abstract in any particular case really depends upon its success in practical application. The primary test of the fitness of political institutions is their compatibility with the character of the people. We have to recognize the fact in this connection, as we should in all discussion of public policy, that political institutions are not the end but the means of progressive civilization.

In reality, political institutions are molded by and for the industrial needs and social requirements of the people. There are states of civilization where despotism is preferable to democracy, and there are states where despotism becomes intolerable and democracy inevitable. The basis of the evolution from theocracy, autocracy and aristocracy to democracy is the industrial and social development of the people. As the people are industrially so they will be socially, and as they are socially

so must they be politically. With a low state of industrial development, where poverty, ignorance and social simplicity prevail, religious superstition and political despotism are inevitable; because under those conditions the people are not sufficiently informed, they are not sufficiently intelligent nor sufficiently characterful to either require or demand a high type of political institutions. Wherever laborers work for a few cents a day, religious freedom and political independence are practically impossible. Indeed it may almost be taken as a test or standard for classification that religious freedom, social individuality and political democracy, or representative government, are proportionate to the rate of wages and standard of living of the masses in the given country. For instance, it would be practically safe to say that wherever wages are below fifteen cents a day the religion will be paganism and the government absolute despotism; neither Christianity nor representative monarchy can be sustained by the intelligence and character that can live on fifteen cents a day. Where wages are twenty-five to fifty cents a day we may expect Christianity, but it will be the earliest and most despotic form, *viz.*:

Greek or Roman Catholic; and in government we shall find the most arbitrary type of monarchy. Where wages are from fifty cents to a dollar or a dollar and a half, we may find some degree of right to free religious opinion, the possibility of Protestantism, and representative government. And where the wages are two dollars or more, we may expect complete freedom in religion and democracy in government.

This may seem a materialistic way of classifying the religious and social institutions of the human race, but it is in accordance with universally observed facts, and it is because all types of freedom, whether religious, social or political, come from the demands of the people to whom the institutions apply; every concession of religious freedom, from the absolute despotism of Constantine down, has been a concession to the growing demands for the right of individual opinion among the people. This has universally been the outcome of more prosperous industrial conditions and more highly diversified social life; these things have stimulated the growth of individual opinion and the right of individual thought.

The same is true with reference

to the growth of political institutions. Every concession, from despotism down to the Declaration of Independence, was made as a reluctant yielding to the imperative, and even threatening demands of the people for more power and representation in the government. This too has come along with the growing material condition and expanding social character of the people. Had democratic institutions come in any other way, they would have come before the people were prepared for them; but as it was the people were capable of using them for their own political and social advantage. The history of the last thousand years of Europe has been the history of revolution and struggle for the free institutions which now exist, the highest type of which is in the United States.

What has been true in the history of the struggle for religious and political freedom in the evolution of modern democratic institutions is equally true in the case of the people for whom we have to furnish a form of government. The people of Porto Rico, of Hawaii, of the Philippine Islands, have not evolved the conditions for democratic government. They have not gone through the process

of industrial growth, social expansion, and intelligent political experiments. They are practically in the thirteenth century; they are practically in the twenty-five-cent-a-day civilization, where arbitrary Christianity and despotic government only have been developed. Frankness demands, therefore, that we look the problem squarely in the face and recognize the fact that these people are not fit for democracy. They are no more fit for democracy than were the people of England in the reign of Edward III., nor than are the people of Russia or Turkey to-day.

It has been said that nothing succeeds like success, and the success of this republic depends upon the successful administration of its political institutions. If we fail to recognize the important conditions necessary to free political institutions, and act upon the mere sentiment that democracy is the American idea, and is the only form of true freedom, and that therefore whoever are under American authority must have the full opportunity of absolute democratic institutions, we shall simply be running to seed; we shall be resting upon the soap bubbles of sentiment instead of upon the true basis of historic

induction and the principles of sound political science. It is beyond all question true that democracy is the highest type of political government, but it is also true that that highest type is only possible with a people who are industrially and socially prepared for it. Under a democracy the form of government rests on the character of the great mass of the people. If they are poor, weak and ignorant, the democracy will be feeble, corrupt and impotent. Pope expressed a good deal of truth when he said:

"For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administered is best."

That government is always best for a people which is best adapted to promote the opportunities and possibilities for their own industrial and social development, at the stage and under the conditions then existing, whatever they may be at the moment.

It is probably true that the Czar is better for Russia in its present industrial state, than would be a monarchy as liberal as that of England, and very much better than would be a democracy like that in the United States. The average Russian peasant is a political baby. What he needs is industrial opportunity; what he needs is the stimulation that diversified

industries and more complex educational and social experience can give. Out of that will grow a natural demand for more freedom in the different lines of government, and social life. The surest sign that the Russian people are not ready for any considerable concession of political power is the fact that they have never asked for it; they have never indicated in any way that they were suffering for the want of it; that they had ideas of how to use it; that they had interests to be promoted by political power if they had it. Until that time comes, until the indication of political hunger shows itself, expansion of political power might be a dangerous mistake.

In England, which represents the highest freedom in monarchical institutions, a Czar would be utterly irksome and oppressive,—nay, he would be impossible. Revolution would dispossess any king or potentate who should assume to exercise despotic authority. Why? Solely because the development of interests, needs, desires and ambitions among the English people have created in them an imperative demand for direct participation in government. There we have a type of freedom practically equal to our

own; there we have representative government, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of discussion, manhood suffrage, and in fact all the elements of representative government and democratic institutions under a monarchical form, the monarchical element being a form only. The peculiar fact is that the English people have, by their own domestic development, even under monarchy, acquired about all the rights and privileges exercised by the American citizen. Why is not the monarchy, then, intolerable? Because it has steadily withdrawn itself from objectionable action; it has steadily gravitated towards the point of non-interference, political impotence. The reason for this is that the freedom of England is wholly the result of evolution or slow growth, and steady, often imperceptible, expansion of human rights and democratic action. It was not the result of a revolution, and hence the line of political authority in England, dating back into the Dark Ages, has been practically continuous. Consequently, an arbitrary or written political constitution has never been found necessary. The English constitution is unwritten law, made up of precedent and tradition, estab-

lished by the steady experience of the people.

There are certain features of an unwritten constitution which make it even better than the written, because it is less difficult to bring about a change. An Act of Parliament which decrees greater freedom for the people in any direction has all the effect of a change in the constitution, whereas with a written constitution a much more formidable effort has to be made, and it is always very difficult if not practically impossible of accomplishment; but clear it is that under the traditional form of monarchical institutions, representative government can exist and the maximum freedom be acquired.

It is not absolutely necessary, therefore, in order to guarantee freedom to the people of the newly acquired islands that they should have a form of absolute elective democracy. It may be urged that if any other form is given to them it is a violation of the principles of the republic. No, that does not follow. The principle of the republic is that it stands for the maximum amount of human freedom, and its duty so far as it has any authority is to promote the conditions which shall furnish the maximum opportunity for the

maximum practical freedom. This would not be produced by absolute democracy in Hawaii, Porto Rico, the Philippines, nor probably in Cuba.

Another proposition that will probably be suggested is that they become territories; that they be not admitted as states into the union, but be made territories and governed in the same way that our present territories are governed. There is one fatal objection to that; it is, the danger that for the political purposes already referred to, an effort will be made to convert them into states without any regard to their industrial or political fitness to be an integral part of the republic. As I have said, we have developed a habit of making the transformation of territories into states a means of promoting the interests of political parties. If an emergency should arise in which either party could perpetuate its existence or secure to itself an added lease of power by adding to the number of United States Senators, there is no reason to believe that it would scruple at converting any one of these new groups into a state for that purpose. I have no doubt whatever that if the exigencies of political parties required it, either party would be

willing to-morrow to convert Hawaii into a state equal to New York or Massachusetts, regardless of the fact that more than half her population are below the thirteenth century status of civilization. This danger is too great to permit the new territories to be put on the basis of our territorial government.

Then what form of government shall they have? They are not fit to have a full democratic form; it would be wholly unsafe to put them in the political position of our territories. How, then, shall they be governed? What form of government is most likely to secure protection to property and opportunity for the maximum industrial development and political growth? In the case of Cuba our course is tolerably clear. It is to permit the Cuban people to give intelligent expression to their desires in regard to their form of government. In the meantime American authority should be preserved until the fullest opportunity has been given for this expression and institution of a form of government by the Cubans. Thus, as soon as they have given evidence of their capacity to form a government, and the disposition of the people to acquiesce in the government, and the govern-

ment's power to maintain the rights of property, safety of individuals and freedom of opinion, then the administration of the government should be entrusted to the Cuban people. It may not be a pure democracy. It may be a government based somewhat on property, somewhat on intelligence and somewhat on population. The government of Cuba, however, by our own declaration, is bound to pass into the hands of the Cubans as soon as these conditions are fulfilled, which it is to be hoped will not be long after the complete evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish troops has taken place. It is not necessary and it ought not to be expected that this government will entirely withdraw its authority until the experiment has gone along sufficiently to assure the civilized world that at least protection to persons and property, civil and religious liberty, are thoroughly secured to all classes, regardless of their social condition or previous attitude towards the government.

In the case of Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines, however, the matter is quite different. The first two of these have fallen into our hands unconditionally. They are to be governed by the United States, and if we keep the

Philippines the same will be true of them. What form of government shall we introduce there? There are many dangers to our political system involved in these new responsibilities. In the first place, we have had practically no experience in colonial government. The nearest we came to it was in the carpet-bag government of the South after the war. Everybody knows what that was. Under the spoils system, which has become an ingrained part of our political methods and political ideas, the government of the southern states after the rebellion was regarded and treated largely as opportunity for exploitation by political appointees. If these new territories are to be governed in the same manner, then there is danger that they will not only be treated to corrupt political incompetency but that the political corruption will react on our own political life.

It may be asked if this country is not as competent to govern colonies as England. I answer, no. England has had centuries of experience in governing colonies. It has become a traditional part of her political life. We have had none. In England, diplomacy of which colonial government is a part is reduced almost to a science. Men are trained in the

service and kept in the service, with as much independence and security of permanence in the service and freedom from mere party politics as are the officers of our navy, and consequently what is termed the "merit system" has arisen, through a normal course of evolution. It is not a matter of four years' appointment, during a political administration, with the opportunity of an appointee to make as much wealth as possible out of it during his term; but it is a systematic part of the government which is practically removed from the sphere of spoils politics. With us the thing is entirely different. All appointments would be for the brief term of four years, with the expectation that at the end of the four years no amount of merit or efficiency would keep them in their position, and hence each colonial government, with the whole network of underlings, would be a field for political patronage. This additional patronage would necessarily react upon our domestic politics. It would become a part of the grand grab of a presidential election; the rewards for the workers and the opportunities for demanding office would be vastly multiplied, so that every heeler would

have the right to demand the removal of somebody, if not at home, in some of our foreign dependencies. This is a part of the results of the traditional methods by which politics have been conducted in this country. It is nobody's fault in particular; it does not mean that our public men are less honest and patriotic than the public men of England and other countries; it means only that we have grown up under a different method, have acquired different political habits and a different type of rewards and punishments for political virtues. But this adds greatly to the danger of territorial government by appointment from Washington.

Is there any way by which dangers of this kind can be avoided? Perhaps it is impossible for the United States to give an ideal government to these islands, partly because of their own unfitness and partly because of our own inexperience, but we must endeavor to minimize the dangers of spoils politics and maximize the possibilities of freedom and growth towards self-government among the peoples over whom we are to exercise this new authority.

I shall not pretend to draw up a code or constitution for the government of these new posses-

sions, but it would seem that the best results to the people and to ourselves will be found in the direction of giving the people as much self-government as possible and the American government as little appointing responsibility as possible. This, of course, can only be accomplished by a careful examination of the desires and interests of the responsible people in these islands. It is more than probable that the principle of restricted franchise would be most workable and produce the best effects. Of course, no non-representative form of government is to be thought of. The parliamentary system must be introduced. Under no other conditions can natural expansion and political progress be expected. Municipal government should be left entirely to the people themselves, and some system should be devised for the general government by which the people, on some responsible basis of property and intelligence, can be represented in the legislative departments. The governor or president, as the case may be, would probably have to be appointed by the United States, but he should have the minimum appointing power in the government over which he presides. A veto-

ing power, with complete charge of the army and navy, should be the limit of his authority. Of course it may be advisable that the United States government have some final vetoing power in certain cases, but the constitution should be as elastic as possible, so that the interest and voice of the people of the islands should be as completely expressed as possible in all the laws under which they have to live; but above all, the Washington government should not have the power of filling subordinate offices by appointment. In other words, the form of government should be made to develop and secure the educational opportunities of the people and entire freedom of religious opinion. Of course, foreign and international trade relations would be subject to the decision of the United States.

If the government of these new possessions is formulated along these lines, we may have what we ought to have—the possibility of rapid growth towards political freedom in each of these groups of islands, that they may become self-governing, as it is to be hoped Cuba will be at the start. In this way, and I think in this way only, we can live up to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, *viz.*: pro-

mote the growth of democratic institutions, and do it without injury to ourselves. If ultimately, with the industrial progress and social development which connection and intercourse with the United States may promote, they reach a point for capacity of complete self-government, it ought to be understood that they shall have it—that it shall not require a revolution to give them independence but that they shall have the right of independence as soon as the capacity for full, responsible democratic government is clearly developed.

If under such freedom and more perfected political institutions these communities desire to become an integral part of the United States, if they want annexation, if their industrial development has been such that they have got out of the mediæval, hand-labor conditions and have reached the plane of modern methods and wage conditions, so that their industrial quality will harmonize with the industrial character of the United States, then annexation may properly be considered. Then they may become an integral part of the United States; then the expansion of the republic will be a natural expansion, a natural growth; then

the opportunities of absorption or integration of these peoples into the one great republic will be directly in line with the steady growth and march of evolutionary development. Such annexation is in the order of our natural destiny. It is consistent with the broadest application of the Monroe Doctrine and the sanest principles of political science, *viz.*:—the natural integration of population through industrial and political affinity and fitness. When that comes, annexation will be a benefit both to the annexed territory and to the republic itself; but until that time comes, every effort at governing these new possessions should be directed towards the growth of their capacity for complete self-government and industrial expansion. To promote this end is the duty of the United States in the present emergency.

The government of these territories, I insist, would be almost a crime had we sought it by force, but it having fallen as an involuntary duty upon us, in pursuing the legitimate duty of aiding a struggling island in acquiring emancipation from a debasing and demoralizing despotism; it having come, I say, as an incident to this truly beneficial and freedom-giving effort in driving Spain

from this hemisphere, we are bound to assume the responsibility. But in assuming the responsibility, I repeat, it is our solemn and imperative duty to apply the highest wisdom of which we are capable to formulating political institutions, not for the purpose of giving political power to Americans over these people, but to give these people the maximum power of which they are capable in governing themselves and securing the greatest possible opportunities, industrial and political, for self-development. Our policy should lead as directly as possible to gradual acquisition of more power over themselves by these people, which shall ultimate in complete self-government; so that their ultimate annexation to the United States, if it comes, shall be the result of intelligent, voluntary political desire, with mutual benefit and advancement of general civilization, both by the development of complete freedom at home and the example of successful evolution towards true democracy for the rest of the world.

QUESTIONS

Question. You seem to imply that political or military revolutions are always harmful. Is it not a fact that such revolutions

merely represent a long previous period of evolution, so that the final outbreak is merely the cracking of the shell, and proves that the people have reached a position of fitness for the thing they demand, as in our own revolution and that of Cuba?

Answer. Yes, revolutions always have a harmful element, but the aggregate result may not be harmful as compared with remaining in the previous state. It is true that revolutions are the result of previous evolution, or growth, but the fact that the opposing power fails to yield by concessions however gradual, but resists until the arbitrary breaking up of institutions, like the overthrow of monarchy, is resorted to, is the revolutionary element and always involves an arbitrary rearrangement of society.

Now what I intended to impress in my remarks was that this arbitrary rearrangement involved, which you call the "cracking of the shell," is the harmful part. It is not quite like the cracking of the shell. The cracking of the shell by the chick is but the derangement of the unimportant part of the machinery, whose usefulness has been outgrown. The revolution is an uprooting of the entire system and

establishment of new institutions, not a modification of the old, but radically different from the old. That was true of our Revolution, and hence we had to construct a written constitution. It is the iron-clad character of this written constitution to which I referred. England is a good illustration. The shell has been cracked in England a great many times, but the fabric from the foundation was never permanently revolutionized. In other words, it is the difference between reform and revolution. In the case of Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and perhaps the Philippine Islands, it is revolution. It is not the reform of existing institutions, nor even their reconstruction, but the erection of a brand new form of government. I repeat that this element, which revolution inevitably makes necessary, is always a disadvantage because it gives a non-elastic basis to the political and social structure.

Question. If, as you say, the people of the Philippines and Hawaii are not fit for self-government, why do you propose to leave all matters of municipal government, which is the most important kind of government, wholly to the people of those islands, our government only

to have a remote vetoing power?

Answer. Because in that way the government will be molded most nearly in accordance with the ideas and character of the people. From the point of view of highest civilization municipal government is indeed important, perhaps the most important; but it does not so directly affect the preservation of order, protection of property and the general stability of political institutions as does the general government. The reason for suggesting that our government have only a remote vetoing power is to preserve the possibility of checking anything destructive to general security and political order, and give the greatest opportunity for the people to evolve a government most in accord with their own state of civilization. I said we should insist that the principle of government be representative. Our interference should be to maintain this element. But it is more than probable that the strong men and business interests under this supervision would develop a restricting representation on the basis of a strictly conditioned suffrage, and so have what would be in effect a government by the better class in the community.

As I said, however, it should be insisted that liberal educational institutions be maintained, so as to provide the opportunities of social stimulation towards suffrage expansion and growth of democratic methods.

Question. If you do not favor giving more political freedom to Russia, what would you suggest as a means of relieving the Russian peasants from the crushing taxation and terrorism under which they live?

Answer. Russia is practically in the era of despotic paternalism. What I would suggest for Russia would be government aid to the diversification of industries. The crushing taxation of Russia is due to her attempt to keep up a military organization equal to the highly industrialized countries, on crude, simple, primitive industries. The Russian government could not do better than build some factories and some more railroads or, if needs be, give special inducements to foreign capitalists to go and locate there. There is a stage of civilization where paternalism is more effective than individualism, in exactly the same way that under certain conditions monarchy and aristocracy furnish a better government than democracy. Russia is in the

era, as I said, of industrial paternalism, and the highest statesmanship of Russia to-day would be governmental initiation of diversified industries.

Question. You seem to speak very favorably of the idea that when the Philippines and Hawaii, and Porto Rico, have developed to the necessary point of fitness, they may properly be annexed to the United States. Is not this in contradiction of all your previous teaching that our mission should be confined entirely to the western hemisphere, and if any annexation took place in the future it should be only of American countries, leaving all other regions to be absorbed in other spheres of political influence?

Answer. I did not intend to give the idea of favoring the annexation of the Philippines under any conditions. That territory properly belongs to Asia, and could never be naturally integrated with the American republic. If the accidents of fate force the responsibility upon us of directing the growth of political freedom in the Philippines, our object should be of course to act in accordance with the natural law of national development and the principles of political science, and promote the growth of indus-

trial expansion and political freedom in the Philippines in every way possible; but when the Philippines have reached the point of fitness for complete self-government and democratic institutions their true function will be to aid in extending the influences of industrial development and political freedom into Asia, and so become missionaries, as it were, of a high civilization in the Orient; and not be segregated from the East by any political integration with the United States or any other western political organization.

Question. Of course there is much truth in the idea that an unwritten constitution permits greater freedom for new action, but on the other hand, does not a written constitution absolutely protect the great fundamental rights of the common people from ever being usurped by any special interests? In other words, is it not more important to guard against encroachments of special interests, which are always easy in a democracy, than to make the road to new movements so very easy that any kind of radical experiment could be tried before public opinion has a chance really to seriously judge of its merits?

Answer. Under a suddenly cre-

ated democracy, yes; but under a slowly and gradually developed type of government, no. It is the very fact of freedom from the restraint of tradition and custom that makes the ironclad constitution necessary in a suddenly established democracy, as a check to inadvisable legislation. If the institutions are gradually evolved, modified and re-modified in the light of and with great respect for the traditional customs of the country,—as is the case in England—sudden rash innovations become impossible from the nature of things. This rashness can only come when the anchorage of tradition has been destroyed. It is for that reason that in a newly established form of government, where previous traditions have been swept away, a definite written constitution becomes indispensable. This is pointedly illustrated in the state of public opinion on finance in this country. The American people have absolutely no regard for traditional financial ideas and institutions. No one system of banking and currency has been permitted to remain long enough to establish what might be called a traditional respect for it. Hence, there is nothing politically sacred about it. It can be

handled as ruthlessly and with as little regard as a new rag doll. Tradition and social custom constitute the strongest of all checks against social and political innovation. Witness the effect of the Chinese tradition of the sacredness of the burial ground. It exercises such strong social authority that even the absolute despotism of the Emperor cannot disregard it. A written constitution is like every other form of political institution. It is essentially necessary under certain conditions, *viz.* in the establishment of radically new political institutions. But under conditions of traditional growth the written constitution is not only not necessary but would be a nuisance.

Question. I understand you to say that the silver crisis in this country would not have occurred except for the large number of silver Senators from the small mountain states. Is not this too narrow a view of the silver movement? It was based on a great conviction, throughout the West, and if its chief strength had not been shown in the Senate it would have taken form in some other way, as on the popular vote for Congressman or President for instance.

Answer. No, I do not think

that is an especially narrow view. By the silver crisis, of course I meant the political crisis caused by the silver question. If there had been in the Senate a strong majority against the free coinage of silver, as a fair proportional representation of the sentiment of the country would have given, the silver advocates would not have been so arrogant and threatening because they would have seen that their cause could only succeed by convincing the people and changing public opinion on the subject. But when they saw they could "hold up" the Senate, as it were, they became arrogant and dictatorial and entirely irrational. I think, therefore, it is fair to say that the discussion would not have reached the point of threatening a political crisis but for the abnormal senatorial representation from the mountain states.

Question. Is it entirely true to say that the truth of an abstract rule depends on its success in practical application? For instance, is it not an absolute truth that democracy is the highest type of government yet developed, regardless of the fact that it might not work in the Philippines?

Answer. Yes, I think it is essentially true to say that the truth of

an abstract rule depends on its success in practice. There is no other test of the truth of a rule of conduct or policy. If it won't work in practice that is the evidence that it is not abstract truth. You ask if it is "not an absolute truth that democracy is the highest type of government yet developed, regardless of the fact that it might not work in the Philippines?" Whether or not democracy would work in the Philippines is not a full test, but it must work somewhere. You cannot speak of democracy as absolutely the highest type of government. Democracy is the best type of government for the highest yet developed people, but it is best because it is most suitable to their character and higher developed life.

Form of government is like a coat. It is not absolute at all. Its utility depends entirely upon how it fits the wearer. A truly evolved and well-sustained democracy is a true indication of the highest type of civilized society yet developed. But it cannot itself be called absolutely the highest type of government, any more than the modern costume can be called the highest type of clothing.

Question. You have given a strong and convincing arraignment

of the spoils system, and shown the dangers to come from it in governing new colonies, basing this evidently upon the experience we have had in our own country; yet I have understood from other lectures and writings that you have little sympathy with the civil service reform movement, which has so materially improved our status in this respect, and will probably raise our civil service finally to as high a standard as the English, which you commend so strongly.

Answer. A suddenly created legalized civil service imposed by legislation upon a people whose traditions and customs are foreign to it will not work at all like a similar civil service system which has grown up as a part of the traditional habits and methods of the people. That is the difference between the English civil service and the reformed American civil service. It is because the English civil service is a natural part of their habitual, political thinking and breathing, and because England has had centuries of training in colonial government, that the effect might naturally be expected to be quite different under American than under English management. This is no particular criticism upon the

United States. It is only recognizing a principle which pervades all human conduct, *viz.* that people do well what they have learned to do by the force of habit and custom, and the standard of which rests on long tradition, and they do poorly that which they do without experience and which is contrary to their whole habit of life and principle of political thought.

Question. Your classification of religions according to industrial conditions seems to imply that Christianity, for instance, has no effect in stimulating and moulding the character of poor and ignorant people up to a point of fitness for that religion. The work of missionaries in China and India, and of the mission churches and even the Salvation Army in New York, London and other great cities, shows that a marked general improvement is made in the condition of the poor people, industrially, morally and every way, by arousing their interest in Christian ideals of character and helpfulness, and aiding them to live according to Christian principles.

Answer. I did not intend to imply that Christianity had no stimulating effect upon the char-

acter of poor and ignorant people. On the contrary, Christianity is essentially the religion of a higher and more progressive civilization than such as has paganism. Its central doctrine implies human equality and personal freedom. It encourages and has always been associated with the higher phases of social cultivation, as art, music and pure character. But even Christianity makes very much more headway in highly developed industrial countries than among six-cent-a-day people. Institutions like mission churches, Salvation Armies, etc., are very effective social instruments. Through the instrumentality of Christianity they do indeed take a standard of higher social ideals among classes of people that could not otherwise be reached. Nevertheless, I think it is just as true that Christianity, like every other form of high human standards, succeeds mainly in proportion to the industrial development and social diversification of the people. In other words, that industrial welfare and social expansion furnish much the more fertile soil for the growth of Christianity or any of the higher social and ethical phases of human life.

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H. HAYES ROBBINS, - - - EDITOR

Sept. 17, 1898

INSTITUTE GOSSIP

The Next Lecture

Next week President Gunton will lecture on "Need of Political Education," and, in line with this, the same issue of the BULLETIN will contain the GUNTON INSTITUTE PROSPECTUS for 1898-99, with curriculum of studies for the course on Political Science. This will be a very important number for all our friends who are interested in local centers formed last year or to be organized this fall. The lecture will point out the great need and interest of just this sort of education, and the prospectus will show in detail the methods of the Institute in supplying that need.

Extra copies will be forwarded to all who would like them for distribution to persons who might be interested in this course, or will be mailed direct to lists of such people, sent in by our representatives or friends.

Get Ready Now

Although the lessons of the present year's course on political science do not begin until October, now is the time for the preliminary work of organizing local centers and getting everything in readiness to commence the work promptly when the October Magazine is received. The Institute officers hope and expect that every center formed last year will resume work this fall with increased membership and renewed interest, and that in every locality where any interest in this work was aroused last year a determined effort will now be made to form a center, even though there be not more than half a dozen members at the start. The Institute will aid its representatives in every possible way, and the second year of this new plan of extending its work ought to, and we believe will, show large and significant results.

Bright Prospects

Now that good times are at last an assured reality, the work of enlisting new students and organizing local centers for the study of political science, under the Gunton Institute, ought to be much easier than it was last year. The expense is so small and the interest in the work so great,

when once it is seriously undertaken, that our representatives ought to find the coming season a genuinely profitable one. Profitable, we mean, too, in the financial sense, because it is the policy of the Institute to make as liberal arrangements as it possibly can with all persons who engage to act as its agents or representatives, either in securing subscribers to the Magazine, or students to the Institute courses. The Gunton Institute is not a money-making concern; its object, like that of the great universities, is to carry on an educational work, whose influence shall be widespread for good throughout the country. Nevertheless, it realizes that those whose assistance it invites in this work, must be able to secure from their efforts a proper return, and therefore is willing to co-operate with them on as nearly a cost basis for itself as possible.

The September Gunton's


Gunton's for September is considered an unusually good number. The two opening articles, *Results of the War* and *The Outlook in Domestic Politics* supplement each other very appropriately in that, while the one outlines

the great and enduring benefits to come not only to us and the western hemisphere, but to the whole world, from this war, the second discusses the grave problems that come alongside with these benefits and their probable treatment when thrown into the arena of domestic party politics. Then there is a very interesting article on *Opportunities for Southern Women* by Jerome Dowd, Professor of Sociology and Political Economy in Trinity College; a brief but pointed contribution from C. D. Chamberlin on *Trusts vs. the Town*, answered in an editorial note wherein a very suggestive and perhaps unusual point of view is taken and abundantly supported by facts. A short sketch is given of the distinguished economist, Malthus, whose portrait forms the frontispiece; and there are strong articles on *East Side Living Conditions* and *Naval Lessons from Santiago*, besides the Editorial Crucible, Civic and Educational Notes, Book and Magazine Reviews, Science and Industry Notes and, last but not least, the Gunton Institute Prospectus for 1898-99, with curriculum of studies both for this and for next year. Price 25 cents, \$2.00 per year.

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